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OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
  Appellant Marissia Estabrook appeals the District Court’s decision granting 
Appellee Safety and Ecology Corporation’s (“SEC”) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).  Estabrook argues that the 
Court erred in dismissing her claims against SEC, her former employer, for sexual 
harassment, retaliatory harassment, and retaliation, because the Court failed to accept as 
true the factual allegations in her complaint and applied an overly stringent pleading 
standard.  We will vacate the Order of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings.   
I. Background 
 On January 31, 2012, Estabrook filed a 14-page, 87-paragraph complaint against 
 3 
SEC alleging sexual harassment, retaliatory harassment, racial discrimination,
1
 and 
unlawful retaliation, all in violation of New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (the 
“NJLAD”), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.  Estabrook alleged that she was sexually harassed 
by her co-worker, Marcus Chase, and, later, subjected to non-sexual harassment by Chase 
and other co-workers in retaliation for having made a complaint against Chase.  In the 
most serious allegation of retaliatory harassment, Estabrook, who worked as a chemist 
performing scientific experiments at SEC, alleged that her co-workers falsely accused 
her, or knew who had falsely accused her, of having tampered with experiments in 
potential violation of federal law.  As a result of these accusations, Estabrook alleged, 
SEC suspended, demoted, and constructively discharged her. 
 In her Complaint, Estabrook alleged that SEC was responsible for Chase’s sexual 
harassment, in part because it was on notice that Chase had harassed other female 
employees in the past and failed to take any action to stop it.  Specifically, Estabrook 
pleaded “upon information and belief” that, prior to when Chase sexually harassed her in 
2011, he had sexually harassed her co-worker Felicia Santory, as well as “a woman 
named Gail who worked in Payroll” and “a woman named Patricia, who is African-
American.”  (App. at 22 ¶ 22.)  Estabrook alleged “upon information and belief” that both 
Gail and Patricia had complained to SEC management about the harassment and that 
SEC failed to take corrective or disciplinary action against Chase.  Estabrook also alleged 
that after Patricia complained about Chase, he “made her life so miserable” that she 
                                                 
1
 Estabrook withdrew her racial discrimination claim prior to the District Court’s 
decision. 
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resigned.  (Id. at 23 ¶ 27.)   
 On December 28, 2012, the District Court granted SEC’s motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(c).  The Court concluded that Estabrook’s sexual harassment claim 
failed because she “fail[ed] to allege dates or times on which alleged harassment of other 
woman [sic] employed by SEC occurred,” and “provide[d] no facts to support her 
conclusion that SEC was in fact aware of such incidents or that these incidents were 
reported to SEC management before [Estabrook] made her report of harassment.”  (App. 
at 8.) The Court also dismissed Estabrook’s retaliatory harassment claim, stating that 
“other than noting the close proximity between the report and the actions of her co-
workers, [Estabrook] has not demonstrated that she suffered intentional discrimination 
due to her report of harassment,” and that she failed to allege that the acts of retaliatory 
harassment were severe and pervasive.  (Id. at 11, 12.)  Finally, the Court determined that 
Estabrook failed to present evidence “beyond mere assertions” to support a prima facie 
case of unlawful retaliation.  (Id. at 10.)  The Court held that Estabrook failed to plead 
facts to demonstrate that the adverse employment actions taken by SEC were “undertaken 
in an effort to retaliate for the report.”  (Id. at 11.) 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is plenary.  Rosenau v. 
Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008).  “In reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(c) 
motion, we must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn 
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therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Id. (quoting Jablonski v. 
Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
III. Analysis 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to set forth a “short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Given the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 
(2007), “detailed factual allegations” are not required, but there must be “enough to raise 
a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations 
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”  We have stated that “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus:  
‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to 
suggest’ the required element.  This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the 
pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.”  Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556).  The Supreme Court explained in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 679 (2009), 
that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged,” and observed that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 
to relief will . . . . be a content-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 
its judicial experience and common sense.”     
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A. Sexual Harassment 
 Under the NJLAD, “a plaintiff states a cause of action for hostile work 
environment sexual harassment when he or she alleges discriminatory conduct that a 
reasonable person of the same sex in the plaintiff’s position would consider sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and to create an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.”  Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 
591 (N.J. 1993).  Employer liability in this context is governed by principles of agency, 
and, accordingly, an employer may be liable for its own negligence with respect to a 
hostile work environment.  Id. at 619, 621-22; see Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 
F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994).  For example, an employer may be held liable if 
“plaintiff can show that an employer had actual knowledge of the harassment and did not 
promptly and effectively act to stop it,” Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 622, or if it failed to have 
in place “well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective formal and 
informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring mechanisms.”  Id. at 621.  
“[E]mployers do have a duty to take effective measures to stop co-employee harassment 
when the employer knows or has reason to know that such harassment is part of a pattern 
of harassment that is taking place in the workplace.”  Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 164 
N.J. 38, 62 (N.J. 2000). 
 For purposes of its motion, SEC challenged only Estabrook’s basis for employer 
liability.  The District Court recognized that SEC could be liable on the theory that, prior 
to Estabrook’s complaint regarding Chase, SEC had knowledge that Chase had harassed 
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other female employees and failed to take adequate steps to stop the harassment; 
however, the Court erroneously concluded that Estabrook failed to plead sufficient facts 
to support her claim.  The Court based its dismissal of Estabrook’s claim on her failure to 
allege “dates or times on which alleged harassment of other wom[e]n employed by SEC 
occurred” and failure to plead specific facts to support her allegation that SEC was aware 
of these incidents.  (See App. at 8.)  This level of specificity, however, is not required 
under Rule 8 and the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. 
 Here, Estabrook presented more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  
She presented specific names and factual allegations; she did not merely allege generally 
that Chase had harassed female employees in the past.  The allegations regarding Ms. 
Santory, “Gail,” and “Patricia,” and Gail and Patricia’s reports of harassment to SEC, are 
“factual allegations that state a plausible ground for relief,” not mere legal conclusions.  
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).  In addition, 
Estabrook pleaded other specific facts to suggest that Chase had a history of harassing 
other employees and that SEC management was aware of this, including the fact that 
Estabrook’s supervisor had stated that she could not understand why upper management 
had not done anything about Chase, and another manager’s statement that Chase’s 
conduct was “part of his culture” (App. at 25 ¶¶ 44, 46).  Because the Complaint satisfied 
the pleading requirements of Rule 8 under Twombly, Iqbal, and subsequent decisions of 
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our Court, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Estabrook’s sexual harassment 
claim. 
B. Retaliatory Harassment 
 Just as with a sexual harassment claim, to succeed on a claim that retaliatory 
harassment created a hostile work environment in violation of the NJLAD, a plaintiff 
must allege (1) that the conduct “would not have occurred but for the employee’s 
protected status,” and (2) that the conduct was “severe or pervasive enough to make (3) a 
reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of employment have been altered and 
that the working environment is hostile or abusive.”  Shepherd v. Hunterdon 
Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 24 (N.J. 2002).  Contrary to the District Court’s 
statement that “[t]o successfully allege” this claim, a plaintiff “must prove” these 
elements, a complaint need only set forth factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the 
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  Because 
Estabrook’s Complaint set forth sufficient factual allegations with respect to each of these 
elements, as well as with respect to employer liability, the Court erred in dismissing her 
retaliatory harassment claim. 
 First, Estabrook adequately pleaded that the conduct she complains of would not 
have occurred had she not made a complaint against Chase.  In determining whether a 
plaintiff has produced prima facie evidence of causation, courts “have generally focused 
on two indicia:  timing and evidence of ongoing antagonism.”  Hargrave v. Cnty. of 
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Atlantic, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 424 (D.N.J. 2003).  Here, the District Court itself observed 
that Estabrook pleaded a “close proximity between the report and the actions of her co-
workers” (App. at 12), and these allegations, together with her allegations of ongoing 
antagonism, provide “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to suggest a right to relief.  
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Rogers v. Alt. Res. Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 
(D.N.J. 2006) (observing that “[t]emporal proximity between the protected activity and 
the [retaliation] can be circumstantial evidence of causation” for purposes of an NJLAD 
claim); Hargrave, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (holding that “[i]n cases where the timing of 
[retaliation] is, by itself, inconclusive, plaintiff may demonstrate a causal link by 
producing circumstantial evidence of ‘ongoing antagonism’ or ‘retaliatory animus’ in the 
intervening period between her complaints and the adverse action”).   
 Second, while the District Court correctly observed that Estabrook’s co-workers’ 
acts of social shunning could not be considered “severe and pervasive,” the other alleged 
acts of harassment—for example, Chase’s false statement to Estabrook’s supervisor that 
Estabrook had called her an “ineffectual manager,” his comments to co-workers that he 
was going to get Estabrook fired, and, most significantly, the false accusations of 
tampering—when taken together render it plausible that the totality of the conduct would 
have been enough “to make a reasonable person believe that the conditions of 
employment have been altered and that the working environment is hostile or abusive.”  
See Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 24.  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has recognized, even 
where “many of plaintiff[’s] allegations, standing alone, would be insufficient to state a 
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cause of action,” when “[v]iewed cumulatively,” such allegations can be sufficient to 
present a jury question.  Id. at 25, 26.  Here, Estabrook has presented factual allegations 
that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
 Finally, Estabrook pleaded sufficient facts to render plausible her claim that SEC 
had knowledge of the harassment by her co-workers and acted negligently in failing to 
promptly and effectively stop it.  Estabrook alleged that she reported the retaliatory 
harassment to her immediate supervisor and two other managers, none of whom took any 
action.  In addition, accepting all of her factual allegations as true, it is plausible that SEC 
knew or should have known that when other employees accused her of tampering, such 
accusations actually constituted harassment that SEC was negligent in failing to address.
2
   
 C. Unlawful Retaliation  
 To state a claim for discriminatory retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) 
[she] engaged in a protected activity known by the employer; (2) thereafter [her] 
employer unlawfully retaliated against [her]; and (3) [her] participation in the protected 
activity caused the retaliation.”  Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 629-
30 (N.J. 1995).  The District Court dismissed Estabrook’s claim because she “failed to 
present evidence to support a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation beyond mere 
assertions.”  (App. at 10.)   As we held in Fowler, however, “Even post-Twombly, it has 
                                                 
2
 For example, the Complaint alleged that Estabrook’s supervisor knew that Estabrook’s 
co-workers had been ostracizing and mistreating her and that Chase previously had 
falsely accused her of negative conduct.  The Complaint also alleged that, in connection 
with the tampering investigation, a manager told Estabrook that “either her co-workers 
were setting her up or she was guilty” (App. at 26 ¶ 53), suggesting that there were 
circumstances signaling to SEC that Estabrook had been falsely accused. 
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been noted that a plaintiff is not required to establish the elements of a prima facie case 
but instead, need only put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.’”  578 F.3d at 213.  Thus, to the 
extent the Court suggested that Estabrook’s claim failed because she failed to establish a 
prima facie case and failed to “present evidence,” it did so erroneously.    
 Although the plausibility of Estabrook’s retaliation claim, in our view, presents a 
closer question than her other two claims, we are persuaded that there is sufficient factual 
content in her Complaint that would “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference” 
that SEC is liable for unlawful retaliation.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  We note that, 
contrary to the District Court’s statement that “SEC leadership involved in the 
investigation . . . was not aware of the sexual harassment charge against Chase,” (App. at 
10), Estabrook alleged that, prior to the tampering investigation, she had personally 
discussed her sexual harassment complaints with Walnicki and Lawrence, the two 
managers who ultimately concluded that she had tampered with experiments.  (App. at 
24, 25  ¶¶ 36-37, 46-47; see id. at 26 ¶ 52.)  “View[ing] the facts presented in the 
pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
[Estabrook],” as we must, we agree with Estabrook that the Court erred in dismissing her 
retaliation claim at this stage in the proceedings.  See Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 
F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005). 
IV. Conclusion 
 Because the District Court failed to apply the correct pleading standard in 
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evaluating Estabrook’s Complaint, we will vacate the Order of the Court dismissing her 
sexual harassment, retaliatory harassment, and retaliation claims, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
